As the deputy assistant secretary of defense in the first Trump administration, Colby played a key role in drafting the National Defense Strategy that, for the first time, identified China as an adversary. Over the past four years, Colby has become among the most important voices on foreign policy, particularly China, in the Republican Party and the “America First“ movement and spoken often at national conservative events. Trump’s running mate, Senator JD Vance, has publicly appreciated Colby’s work on prioritising American interests in the Indo-Pacific.

Over a walk on the sidelines of the Republican National Convention in Milwaukee, past Trump signs, Colby talked to HT about what he saw as the possible external orientation of the next Trump term. The interview has been edited for clarity and length:

Q: You are widely billed to get a top national security position in a potential Trump administration. Could you give me a sense of what you see as the top foreign policy priorities and approach of the next administration?

First, I don’t speak for President Trump or Senator Vance or the campaign, and I don’t make any presumptions about any role for myself. I would be honoured to serve if I could have an impact and they asked me, but that’s up to them. That’s all speculation and I don’t presume anything.

But look, I think the themes of the campaign and what President Trump and Senator Vance are saying are quite clear. It’s a common sense approach that’s more realistic, that puts Americans interest first, not in an aggressive or belligerent way. It’s talking about having a strong American military but one that is used sparingly. It talks about a strong industrial base.

It also talks about strong alliances, but ones that are more equitable. The need for stronger but more equitable alliances reflects the military reality, the political reality, and the fiscal reality here. And to me, I think you would see more, not academic realism, but more pragmatic realism, working with countries that share our interests is my sense, but in a kind of more common sense, pragmatic, realistic way. And that might be with countries of varying hues and stripes, but countries that are more self-reliant, tough, strong, willing to take responsibility. So, of course, to me, that means India more than anybody else. I think the future of the US India relationship should be very bright.

Q: You have been a strong proponent, and so has Trump, of European countries taking up more responsibility for their security. What do you think is the future of Ukraine in a Trump administration?

Trump has said he is going to make a big effort to make peace. I support that. I think he has also said, and Vance has also said many times, that the Europeans need to take primary responsibility for their own defence. And some of them are. Poland is now spending 5% of GDP on defence. Meantime, the Germans just cut aid to Ukraine. I think there’s a lot of sturm and drang (storm and stress), but really, they should look to their own house first. The German chancellor has openly endorsed Joe Biden. How about, instead of intervening in our politics, making sure you do your part? If they are so concerned that Russia is a threat to them, as some of them are saying, why aren’t they spending 5%? Personally, I think the Russians are a threat to European NATO, but the best thing they can do is not wring their hands, but rather build up their military capacity.

Q: Do you think, if Trump is able to have some kind of deal with Moscow, there is a possibility of weaning Russia away from Beijing?

I am just skeptical, frankly, of the splitting them. I think Trump is right to say that the results of the current policy under Joe Biden has been to encourage a kind of marriage between Russia and China. But, at this point, we have to be skeptical and realistic about whether we could break Russia away from China at a reasonable cost. That’s potentially a longer term objective. But in any case, I think it’s going to be important for the Europeans to have a strong defence so that Russia doesn’t have the temptation to conduct military aggression to its West.

Q: What do you think will be a potential Trump administration’s approach broadly to on China and specifically on Taiwan?

Again, I can’t speak for either the Trump campaign or Trump. My view is that clearly there is a tough angle and Trump was very historic to shift towards a much more tough line, a realistic approach towards China. Indian friends always say, don’t lecture us about China. You are the ones who built China up for 25 years. You finally got the picture too late. But that was a very important step in the process.

On the military position, as Vance said, we have been distracted in Europe. We have got to refocus on the Pacific so that there is ‘peace through strength’. Then there is re-industrialisation here. We don’t want to have all our stuff built in China.

But the other part of that is also peace. Trump has been warning about World War 3. We know that the Chinese are preparing for a large-scale war with the US. We want to avoid a war. I certainly want to avoid a war. And I think part of that is an openness to a modus vendi with China, not because we like the Chinese system of government or we approve of it, but because China is going to be around. It is a huge economy. It has very capable people. They have high technology, military forces. And Trump has expressed openness to talks with Xi Jinping.

I don’t think that means a G2. Don’t let me be misunderstood. That’s not what we are talking about. We have to strongly deepen relationships with partners such India who are willing to pull their own weight and are tough and strong and capable. But I think it’s also being realistic in the way that the Indian government is realistic about China, that they are going to be around. My own view is different from that of some other China hawks in the sense that we are not going to restore primacy in Asia. We are not going to regime change the Chinese Communist Party and even if the CCP changed, China would still be a challenge. It was the Kuomitang that came up with the nine dash line. So we have got to deal with China as a reality from position of strength, but also be realistic about what we demand.

On Taiwan, I think Trump was absolutely right to call out the very real difficulties of defending Taiwan. The job of the US security establishment is to give the president of the US the best option for being able to defend Taiwan. I don’t think we have done a good job, especially under the Biden administration. It’s also critical that the Taiwanese do their part. I have been saying to them, they should be spending 10% of GDP on defence. They’ve been totally laggardly. So this is again a real wake-up call. We should give the president the best option. If we can defend Taiwan at a reasonable cost and risk, that’s going to stand the best chance of deterring the Chinese. But ultimately that’s a political decision. But in any case, China is going to be our top challenge and Asia has to be the top priority. Exactly where that nets out history will tell in the future.

Q: There have been some concerns in the Indo-Pacific about Trump’s approach to China because of both his comments on Taiwan and his shifting position on TikTok. And then what I hear from you is also, maybe I am over-reading this, but a degree of calibration. Should partners in Asia be worried that the US will do a deal with China?

No, no, because, in my view, there is no mega deal. So there is no reason to be worried about a G2. We must have a tough approach. But my approach has always been, the balance of power, the pursuit of a decent peace and a recognition that China will be a part of the balance of power. But it must be approached realistically, skeptically and with the understanding that if they are given the opportunity to abuse their power, there will be a high likelihood they will do so.

The G2 idea is based on this Kissinger kind of bad notion that there is some trust between the two superpowers and that we will divide the world between ourselves. That’s not how things work, and we will have our lunch money stolen. I actually think our approach is closer to actually the Indian government perspective. That approach isn’t highly ideological or thinking that if the CCP is removed, China will be removed as a challenge. It’s more realistic. It’s what I’ve heard the Foreign Minister (S) Jaishankar talk about. We have to deal with the Chinese. We don’t want a war but we want to be well positioned. So I really stress that G2 is not at all what I’m calling for. I don’t think that’s what I hear from Trump or Vance either.

Q: What are the specific ways in which you think the US-India relationship can advance and deepen further?

A: There is already good momentum because it makes so much structural sense, and that has continued with Prime Minister (Narendra) Modi’s visit to the US last year. I think that I had have to dig deeper into some of the specifics, but I think there’s probably a lot we could do to facilitate more collaboration, more technology facilitation. There are tough issues on the trade front. We are not going to agree on everything. That’s fine. But that’s the whole point of the India way as Jaishankar puts it. We are not going to agree on everything. It’s okay. We are not the same country. You are going to look after your interests. We are going to look after our interests, but we are going to try to work in a way that’s compatible.

Q: This is the most ideologically cohesive Republican ticket in a long time and represents the New Right. So how should the outside world understand the new Republican party?

I think, particularly for India, it should be very encouraging because both on the other side and, in the old Republican Party, there was a kind of an ideologically domineering progressivism. Biden’s comments about India a few months ago where he called it xenophobic was a very revealing comment because it was based on this belief — and Jaishankar was very eloquent about this — that essentially there is one model. It’s based on the kind of western European, Francis Fukuyama kind of end of history approach, that everybody will ultimately have to adapt at some point, and that’s the way it should be. And that’s how right and wrong are determined.

I think the attitude here, this common sense attitude, is not attempting to impose our way on everybody else. It actually has respect for other countries, their national traditions, their autonomy, national traditions, and their path, within reason obviously. But it is more ecumenical in a sense, more tolerant. And so I think that’s a much better basis for working with countries like India and others in Asia, in Africa, in South America, and many parts of Europe like Poland or parts that aren’t Germany or the Scandinavian countries.

If you want a strong America, the only way to have a strong America is if we reconcile our commitments with our resources that are realistically available. And that’s where we’re heading for an iceberg. We are heading for a massive run on the market, run on the bank if we continue on the current course. Whereas I think the common sense approach here is much more likely to result in a sustained, more focused American policy that countries like India that are self-reliant and tough and strong, can work with very well.

Q: So a more careful, more selective, and a more focused approach in terms of priorities but not an isolationist approach?

No, it’s not isolationist at all. I think that’s a canard, and I think that’s not what Trump’s saying. That’s not what Vance is saying. That’s not what the platform is saying. It’s saying, look, we have been running a business and it’s going poorly. We are overstretched. We are not going to close the business. We are not going to shut it down. But we have got to reconcile our expenditures with what we have got coming in, and that’s the best way to save the business.